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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the association between stock prices and discretionary accruals in different 
stock market cycles. The study presents evidence for a discrepancy in prior research and shows 
that investors are able to identify earnings management only in some cases. We argue that 
investors’ reaction to the true nature of EPS varies in different market cycles. We suggests that 
investors pay less attention to the nature of EPS changes in an optimistic cycles, and are more 
critical in neutral or pessimistic cycles. Therefore, investors are more likely to detect and count 
for any earnings management in the neutral or pessimistic cycle than in the optimistic cycle. The 
test results indicated that the association between discretionary accruals and abnormal stock 
returns were insignificant in the neutral market cycle, significant and positive in the optimistic 
cycle and significant and negative in the pessimistic cycle. These findings indicate that investors 
tend to ignore the income-increasing effect of discretionary accruals on EPS changes in an 
optimistic market. The findings suggest that researchers investigating the association between 
stock prices and earnings management should control for the type of the market cycle from which 
their samples are drawn.  
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
rior research on the ability of earnings management to push up stock prices in different market 
situations has brought conflicting results. Some studies have found that earnings management can 
push up stock prices (e.g.Yongtae and Myung, 2005; Fischer and Stocken, 2004; Abarbanell and 
Lehavy, 2003). Other studies have found that investors were able to find the true nature of changes in earnings per 
share (EPS) and disregarded the effect of opportunistic earnings management on the stock prices (e.g. Siew, Welch 
and Wong, 1998; Rangan, 1998; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000). The interesting 
question that emerges is why investors were able to identify the earnings management in some, but not in other, 
cases. This study addresses this issue by investigating the effect of stock market cycles on investors’ use of EPS 
information. As earnings management often take place through the inflation of discretionary accruals, we investigate 
whether different market cycles affect investors’ reaction to discretionary accruals. We classify market cycles as 
optimistic, neutral and pessimistic. Optimistic market cycle is referred to the situation in which stock prices are 
increasing, and investors are optimistic about future economy. Neutral market cycle refers to the situation when the 
market environment does not bring any emotions, and investors evaluate the economic information including EPS 
changes analytically. Pessimistic market cycle exists when a price reevaluation begins across the board and current 
prices are seen as too overstated. In this situation market goes through price correction and the corporate and 
national economic fundamentals do not support the current prices. Investors become critic about the management 
actions and evaluate the information about companies and the economy critically. 
 
Investors are more likely to pay less attention to the true nature of earnings changes in an optimistic market 
cycle because in the optimistic market cycle they are not concerned about management actions and its ambitious 
business plans due to receiving positive information about increases in EPS. This situation presents an opportunity 
for the earnings management through discretionary accruals. The positive market trend in an optimistic cycle attracts 
more unsophisticated and inexperienced investors, who are likely to fail to understand the true nature of changes in 
EPS. This study contributes to the literature on the subject by improving the understanding of when investors are 
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likely to identify the managed earnings and when they are less likely to do so. Findings of this study should help 
future researchers as well as financial analysts to improve their analysis of stock prices and earning management 
through showing the effect market cycles have on investors’ use of EPS information.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: section two presents literature review and hypothesis development; 
section three describes methodology; section four presents test results followed by the summary and discussion in 
section five.  
 
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prior studies present evidence of opportunistic earnings manipulation in various situations. Many research 
investigated the earnings manipulation in the case of equity offering. These studies documented that firms used 
income-increasing accruals before a seasoned equity offering to inflate earnings numbers (e.g Teoh et al., 1998; 
Rangan 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Yongtae and Myung, 2005). Similar pattern was 
found for the case of initial public offering firms (e.g. Li and McConomy, 2004; Ducharme, Malatesta and Sefcik, 
2004) and for the case of stock financial acquisitions (e.g. Erickson and Wang, 1998; Louis, 2004; Heron and Lie, 
2002).  
 
Another line of research investigated earnings manipulation in the cases of meeting forecasts done by 
financial analysts. These studies found that management engaged in earnings manipulation to meet the expectations 
and avoid reporting earnings lower than analysts’ forecasts (e.g. Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005, Lacina and Karim, 2004). Similar findings were reported in research by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), which 
found that firms receiving buy recommendations from analysts are more likely to manage their earnings to meet 
analysts’ earnings expectations. Prior studies also presented evidence that firms engage in earnings management to 
avoid reporting EPS lower than management earnings forecasts (e.g. Kasznik, 1999; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; 
Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) found that firms manage their reported 
earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses. They also found that there are unusually low frequencies of small 
decreases in earnings and small losses, and unusually higher frequencies of small increases in earnings and small 
positive income. Degeorge et al. (1999) also found that firms that are falling short of thresholds manage their 
earnings upward. 
 
While many of prior studies presented useful insight about the situations in which firms are likely to 
manage their earnings, there are only few studies that addressed the situation in which a firm’s ability to engage in 
earnings management is restricted. Investigation of factors that restrict the management’s ability to engage in 
earnings management is important because it can help in investigating  the process of engaging in earnings 
management by firms (rather than only looking at the evidence of earnings management). For example, Marquardt 
and Wiedman (2004) found that firms use different accruals to manage their earnings. Also, Barton and Simko 
(2002) found that due to the effect of accruals reversion, earnings management in the periods following the use of 
accruals is limited by type and extent of the accruals used in the preceding periods. Detection likelihood is another 
factor that has been found effective on the ability of management to engage in earnings management. DuCharme at 
al. (2004) found that the magnitude of unexpected accruals is positively associated with probability of shareholder 
litigation against stock issuing firms. Beneish (1999) found that increase in total accruals was associated with the 
probability of being the target of SEC enforcement action. Another factor limiting the likelihood of earnings 
management investigated by prior studies is perceived earnings quality (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). These 
research found that undetected earnings management could negatively impact the perceived earnings quality by 
shareholders if the earnings management results in higher gap between earnings and cash flow. Research 
investigating when firms are likely and unlikely to engage in earnings management is relatively new, and further 
studies are needed to explore other factors that may affect the process of engaging in earnings management, 
however.  
 
The current study contributes to the literature by investigating the effect of stock market cycles on the 
likelihood of engaging in earnings management. The investigation of the effect of market cycles is important as 
prior studies found that economic conditions, such as market cycles, affect corporate decisions on executive 
performance evaluation and their compensation structure (e.g. Matolcsy, 2000).  
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Different market cycles could influence the engagement in earnings management by affecting shareholders’ 
emotional reaction to earnings changes. In an optimistic market cycle, investors are less likely to investigate the true 
nature of changes in earnings, due to an optimistic environment on the market, as well as the existence of naive 
investors. Naive investors, attracted by the market’s high returns, may not be able to investigate the true nature of 
EPS changes. Thus, the likelihood of detection or questioning the accrual changes is lower in the optimistic cycle. 
Consequently, the potential cost of earnings management in the optimistic market cycle is lower. In a neutral cycle, 
however, investors have no emotional reactions to earnings changes. They analyze the management actions 
analytically, especially for financial reporting policies. There are also fewer naive investors in the market, due to a 
lack of large stock returns in the short-time, a situation usually observed in an optimistic market cycle. Therefore, in 
the case of neutral market cycle, investors are likely to detect the managed portion of earnings and discount it in the 
prices. A pessimistic market cycle affects the cost and likelihood of earnings management differently. In a 
pessimistic cycle investors are more critical of management actions, especially financial reporting, due to the market 
environment being pessimistic. In this situation, investors’ reaction to earnings management might be negative, 
meaning that investors may reduce the stock price of the firms that report increases in discretionary accruals. In 
addition, the impact of negative news in this cycle is greater than the effect of good news.  
 
In accordance with our discussion, we define the following three hypotheses: 
 
H1:  In an optimistic market cycle, increase in discretionary accruals is positively associated with increase in 
unexpected stock returns.  
H2:  In a neutral market environment, increase in discretionary accruals is not significantly associated with 
unexpected stock returns.  
H3:   In a pessimistic market environment, increase in discretionary accruals is associated with a negative 
unexpected stock returns.   
 
III.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Time period and data 
 
 
Table 1 
Market Trend During The Period Of January 01, 1999 To March 31, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Change in the major indexes during neutral cycle 
 
Index            July 01, 97               Sep 30, 98                Change                 % of change 
DJI  7722  7842  120  1.5% 
NASDAQ 953  1345  392  41% 
S&P 500  891  1017  126  14% 
 
Panel B: Change in the major indexes during optimistic cycle 
 
Index            Oct 01, 98                Mar 31, 00                Change                % of change 
DJI  7632  10921  3289  43% 
NASDAQ 1273      4572  3299  259% 
S&P 500  986  1498  512  52% 
 
Panel C: Change in the major indexes during pessimistic cycle 
 
Index            April 03, 00              June 29, 01              Change                  % of change 
DJI  11221  10502  -719  - 6.4% 
NASDAQ 4077  1832  -2245  - 55% 
S&P 500  1505  1224  -281  - 19% 
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As the optimistic market cycle, the period of the third quarter of 1998 until the end of the first quarter of 
2000 was selected. In this period, a major stock market indexes rose significantly as presented in panel B of Table 1. 
It shows that the market breath was generally positive and stock prices rose across the board during this period. Dow 
Jones Industrials (DJI) rose 43%, NASDAQ rose 259% and S&P500 rose 52%.Such optimism, however, did not 
exist in a cycles preceding and following the discussed period. Five quarters were selected before the optimistic 
cycle as the neutral market cycle. During this period, DJI rose only 1.5%, NASDAQ rose 41% and S&P500 rose 
14%. These increase are consistent with normal market returns (Table 1, Panel A). The NASDAQ increase of 41% 
is also normal, since the market was hit by a new wave of IPO companies during that period. As the pessimistic 
cycle, we chose five quarters following the optimistic cycle. During this period, DJI lost 6.4%, NASAQ lost 55% 
and S&P500 lost 19% (Table 1, Panel C). The magnetite of the losses indicates that investors became very critic 
during this period, and price corrections begun to occur across the board. The reason we used quarterly data is 
because quarterly earnings news has been considered the most important piece of information for stock price 
evaluation and it allows us to investigate earnings management on a quarterly basis.  
 
Discretionary Accruals 
 
Firms may manipulate their earnings in two ways. Forstly, it can be done by manipulating a specific items 
such as accounts receivable (Beneish, 1997), bad-debt expense (McNichols and Wilson, 1988), or loan losses 
(Beaver and Engel, 1996). Secondly, the manipulation can be done through total accruals which are non-cash items 
and can have increasing or decreasing effect on net income. While the first approach investigates how a specific 
accounting item could be used to manipulate earnings, the second approach investigates the collective effect of 
accrual items on the reported earnings. In this paper, we use the second approach, for our objective is to investigate 
earnings management in general, without referring to a particular item. Therefore, we calculate total accruals for 
firm i in quarter t as follows: 
 
TACit = (CAit - Cashit) – (CLit – CPLit) – DEPit                     (1) 
 
where TACit is total accruals, CAit is total current assets, Cash is total cash and equivalent, CLit is total current 
liabilities, CPLit is total current portion of long term debt, and DEPit is depreciation expense.  indicates change in 
the respective variable. TACit includes both portions of non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Accordingly, 
discretionary accruals are computed as follows: 
 
DACit = TACit – NDACit                     (2) 
 
where DACit is discretionary accruals for firm i in quarter t and TACit is total accruals reported by firm i in the same 
quarter. NDACit refers to non-discretionary accruals.  
 
In the absence of earnings management, the mean of DACit should be zero during the test period. A 
positive mean of discretionary accruals indicates the use of accruals to overstate earnings. Non-discretionary 
accruals are estimated using modified Jones model. This model has been found more appropriate than other existing 
models in capturing non-discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995). We used this model to estimate non-
discretionary accruals: 
 
NDACit/TAi,t-1 = 1(1/TAi,t-1) + 2(NREVi,t/TAit-1) + 3(PPEit/TAi,t-1)                    (3) 
 
where NDACit refers to non-discretionary accruals, TAi,t-1 is total assets, NREVi,t is total revenue net of receivables, 
PPEi,t is total plant, property and equipment, and  is the respective coefficient. The model parameters, 1, 2 and 
3, are estimated using an OLS regression.  
 
Sample Selection 
 
Initial samples were obtained from Compustat. We required that firms must have at least 25 necessary data 
to compute model 3 for the period of the first quarter of 1990 through the end of the third quarter of 1998. This 
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selection procedure resulted in a sample of 1509 firms. Table 2 presents the breakdown of the sample based on 
industry membership. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample. 
 
 
Table 2 
Industry Classification Of Sample Firms 
                                                                                                                      Number of Firms  
 
Basic Industries       115 
Capital Goods      385 
Construction         44 
Consumer Goods      813 
Energy        110 
Finance                        42       
Total                     1509 
                                                                                                           
The following approach is used to classify the samples into the different industries: 
 
Basic Industries: 1000-1299, 1400-1499, 2600-2699, 2800-2829, 2870- 2899, 3300-3399. 
 
Capital Goods: 3400-3419, 3440-3599, 3620-3629, 3670-3699, 3800-3849, 5080-5089, 5100-5129, 
5160-5169, 7300-7399. 
 
Construction: 1500-1999, 2400-2499, 3220-3299, 3430-3439, 5200-5219. 
 
Consumer Goods: 0000-0999, 2000-2399, 2500-2599, 2700-2799, 2830-2869, 3000-3219, 3420-3429, 
3600-3619, 3630-3669, 3700-3719, 3850-3899, 3900-3999, 4830-4899, 5000-5079, 
5090-5099, 5130-5159, 5180-5199, 5220-5999, 7000-7299, 7400-9999. 
 
Energy:  1300-1399, 2900-2999, 5170-5179. 
 
Finance:  6000-6999. 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the sample is distributed across industries considering the size of each industry. Table 3 
shows that the means of discretionary accruals. The negative mean in the pessimistic cycle indicates the mean 
reversion of accruals.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
We use the following model to test the hypotheses:  
 
ARit = ß0 + ß1DTACit                        (4) 
 
 
                Panel A: Breakdown of discretionary accruals by period: 
 
Market cycle           Mean       SD 
Neutral      .0202      1.212 
Optimistic    .0595      1.239 
Pessimistic             -.0121        .374 
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where ARit is unexpected stock returns and DTACit is discretionary accruals. Investors’ reaction to charges in 
discretionary accruals in each market cycle is tested as follows:  
 
If ß1 = 0   no investors’ reaction 
If ß1 > 0   positive reaction 
If ß1 < 0   negative reaction 
 
We calculated unexpected stock returns using the market model and used S&P 500 as the market proxy. 
 
IV.  TEST RESULTS 
   
 The test results are presented in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4 
Regression Test Results 
 
 
Table 4 shows that β1 is insignificant for the neutral cycle, which indicates that increase in discretionary 
accruals is not associated with higher unexpected stock returns. These findings provide a support for the hypothesis 
1 and suggest that investors detected abnormal changes in discretionary accruals and discounted them in the stock 
prices. Table 4 also shows that the coefficient is positive and significant for the optimistic cycle indicating that 
increase in discretionary accruals was associated with higher unexpected stock returns. These findings support 
hypothesis 2 and indicate that investors did not pay attention to the true nature of earnings changes in the optimistic 
cycle. For the pessimistic cycle, the coefficient is negative, but weakly significant. This indicates that although the 
sign of the coefficient presents support for hypothesis 3, we do not find strong support for this hypothesis.  
 
Industry Effect 
 
In this section, we focus on optimistic cycle for which we found strong positive association between 
increase in discretionary accruals and stock returns. We test whether the industry membership was effective. This 
type of investigation helps to indicate whether industry membership was a significant factor in engaging in 
managing earnings during the optimistic cycle. The investigation is also beneficial as the degree of optimistic market 
environment can vary depending on the industry. To test the industry effect, we compute the following metric for 
each industry: 
INDINDiIND nDACDAC /,
 
 
where INDDAC is the mean of discretionary accruals for each industry, DACi,IND is discretionary accruals for firm I 
in each industry, and nIND is number of the firms in each industry. The test results are presented in table 5.  
 
Table 5 indicates that the discretionary accruals means are significant for the following four industries: 
capital goods, construction, consumer goods, and energy (consumer goods is significant at .1 level).The mean, 
however, is not significant for basic industries and finance. The findings show that earnings management was not 
observed across industries alike. These findings suggest that market optimism, providing the incentive for earnings 
management, may exist only in certain industries. 
 
Market Cycles     ß0   t-value      ß1   t-value 
 
Neutral      1.76           8.450      .157      .917 
Optimistic            2.033   11.118   .148    2.864 
Pessimistic     .913   4.143   -.971   -1.650 
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Table 5 
Earnings Management And Industry Membership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents evidence about the effect of stock market cycles on the association between earnings 
management and stock price returns. It shows that when the stock market is in its optimistic cycle, it affects 
investors, who tend to ignore the nature of changes in earnings. In such conditions, investors are more receptive of 
ambitious business actions done by management, which may results in higher accruals. This situation presents 
ground for the likelihood of engaging in earnings management. In addition, the market high performance in an 
optimistic cycle attracts naive investors who may not be able to analyze the nature of changes in EPS and distinguish 
between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Our results provide that one dollar increase in discretionary 
accruals resulted in fifteen cents increase in stock price return on average in the optimistic market cycle. On the 
other hand, our results show that investors were able to identify the effect of discretionary accruals on EPS changes 
in the neutral market environment and discount that effect in the stock prices. The test results proved that there was 
no association between increase in discretionary accruals and increase in stock prices in the neutral cycle. This could 
be due to the fact that there is no emotions involved in decision making in this cycle, and fewer naive investors exist 
in the market. Furthermore, our test results show that investors may react negatively to increase in discretionary 
accruals in the pessimistic cycle. We found a negative relationship between increase in discretionary accruals and 
stock prices in the pessimistic cycle. These findings suggest that when the market environment is generally negative, 
boosting EPS by increasing discretionary accruals will have a negative effect of investors’ valuation of stock prices. 
The test results also prove that the association between increase in discretionary accruals and increase in stock 
returns was not the same in all investigated industries. It suggests that the optimistic cycle could be driven by factors 
that affect only certain industries.  
 
This study contributes to the growing literature on the subject of factors limiting firm’s ability to engage in 
earnings management, as well as the effect of market cycle in this process. Furthermore, the results presented in this 
study may help researchers and financial analysts to understand the true nature of ratios such as P/E (price to EPS) 
and P/B (price to book value) in different market cycles. Our findings suggest that the time series analysis of P/E 
and P/B ratios without proper adjustment for the effect of market cycles on discretionary accruals may be biased and 
misleading.  
 
This study is limited in some aspects. We selected firms that had sufficient data in Compustat files; 
although our sample is fairly large for statistical analyses, the effects of firms not listed in Compustat or without 
sufficient data are excluded. We also selected the total of fifteen quarters as optimistic, neutral and pessimistic 
cycles. Although those quarters reflected dramatic shifts during the selected time period, the effect of larger cycles 
may not be consistent with our results. Also, we use the data of the U.S. stock markets, which may not represent the 
effect of market cycles in other courtiers. These limitations present opportunities for future studies to extent research 
on this topic. In addition, the findings of this paper could be reevaluated using other models presented in the 
literature (such as industry-based model) for normal accrual estimation. 
 
 
 
 
Industry   Samples  IND
DAC
  T-value  Sig. 
 
Basic Industries     115  1.149   1.086  .280 
Capital Goods     385  .073   3.537  .000 
Construction       44  .052   3.418  .001 
Consumer Goods     813  .178   1.810  .071 
Energy      110  .137   3.413  .001 
     Finance         42  8.372   1.553  .128 
          Total   1509 
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